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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARVIN L. BELLONf MAURINE G,
BELLONf B. CURTIS DASTRUP,
LANIS B. DASTRUP, and
A. LABRUM & SONS, INC.,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 88-0226

MARVEL L. MALNAR,
Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
the provisions of Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, and
Rule 3a, Rules of Utah Supreme Court, and Section 3 and Section 5
of Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final Judgment of the District
Court of Duchesne County, Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows:
A.

Did the Court err in failing to enforce the

liquidated damages clause of the Real Estate Contract on the basis
that plaintiffs had suffered an unconscionable forfeiture?
Specifically, did the actual damages suffered by defendant

(seller) as delineated in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Ut 468,
243 P2d 446 (Utah, 1952), to-wit,
1.

Loss of bargain,

2.

Damage to, or depreciation to property,

3.

Unpaid interest,

4.

Unpaid taxes and water assessments,

exceed the liquidated damages amount so that liquidated damages
clause should be enforced?
B.

(Point I.)

Did the Court err in failing to follow the doctrine

of Perkins v. Spencer and subsequent cases applying the same and
in substituting its own theory of damages?

Specifically, did the

Court err in allowing the buyer credit for the increased value, if
any, of the land at the time of forfeiture over the contract as
though the return of the land to the seller constituted a payment
to seller?

Did the Court err in considering in effect eminent

domain proceeds received by seller over one year after forfeiture
as a payment on the contract?
C.

(Point II.)

Did the Court err in quieting title to the six-acre

tract in plaintiffs, or should the Court have determined that the
six acres, although greatly reduced in value (by reason of
encumbrances and the necessity of a quit-title action) still
belong to the defendant? (Point III.)
D.

Is the value of the 76 acres, which is in excess of

the purchase price, relevant (assuming there is such an excess)?

If SOf what is the determinative time for such valuation and what
was the value of the land at that time? (Point IV.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHERE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Not applicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an action by plaintiffs/

respondents seeking return of moneys paid under the real estate
contract on the basis of an alleged unconscionable forfeiture.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

The case was tried to Judge Boyd

Bunnell, without a jury, being an equity case.

At the conclusion

of the evidence, the Court directed that the parties make their
closing arguments by written memoranda, rather than orally, and
such were duly submitted by the parties. (R. 48-127)
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT.

Thereafter, the Court

rendered a Memorandum Decision dated April 7, 1988, and entered on
April 20, 1988, (R. 163-9) ruling that defendant was required to
reimburse plaintiffs the sum of $71,183.14, and in addition
quieting title in plaintiffs to six acres of the land covered by
the real estate contract.
Thereafter, proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment were submitted, and defendant filed numerous
objections thereto (R. 171-197) and requested oral argument of
said objections.

Oral argument was not permitted.

The Court

directed that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

"eliminate any reference to prejudgment interest" and directed
that paragraph 5 should be amended to show that "a copy of the
warranty deed was placed with the escrow holder," rather than the
original.

With those changes, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Judgment were duly entered on May 17, 1988.

(R. 128-144)

Notice of Appeal was served and filed by defendant in
the Duchesne County Clerk's office on June 10, 1988. (R. 206)
Plaintiffs filed Notice of Crossappeal on June 22, 1988. (R. 217)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 19, 1980, plaintiffs' predecessor in
interest, Ferron Elder, as buyer, entered into a Real Estate
Contract with defendant, Marvel Malnar, as seller, for sale of 76
acres of land in Duchesne County, Utah, together with 12 shares of
water, for the total purchase price of $152,000. (Ex. 5, T. 36,
T. 232)

Paragraph 12A of the contract contained forfeiture and

liquidated damage provisions.
in the Addendum hereto.)

(A copy of the contract is included

At that time a down payment of $23,500

was paid (T. 41), and a Warranty Deed to said property made out to
the buyer was placed in escrow, to be delivered to the buyer when
all payments on the Contract had been made. (T. 78)

At the same

time a Quit-claim Deed (covering all 76 acres and water shares)
from the buyer to the seller was placed in escrow, to be returned
to seller and recorded in the event of default of the buyer. (Ex.
10, T. 76)

A Warranty Deed to six acres out of the 76 was also

executed by defendant to said buyer and was to have been placed in

escrow,
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defendant Maliia-:, who recorded the same February 3, 1984.

Prior theretof on October 18, 1982f Deseret Transmission
had commenced a condemnation action seeking to condemn a right-ofway across the 76-acre tract for a high-tension power line. (Ex.
35)
On February 9, 1984f Eastern Utah Resources executed a
Notice of Interest against the entire 76 acres of the property,
which was recorded February 14, 1984.

The said Notice of Interest

referred to an Assignment of Contract dated February 25, 1983,
wherein it stated that Ferron Elder had assigned to Eastern Utah
Resources all of his right, title and interest in and to the
aforesaid Real Estate Contract made and entered into between
Marvel Malnar as seller and Ferron Elder as buyer.

The said

Notice of Interest as of the time of trial had not been released.
(Ex. 24)

Clark Jenkins, one of the partners of Eastern Utah

Resources, testified that Eastern Utah Resources recorded the
said Notice of Interest after they learned that Mrs. Malnar had
undertaken action by reason of their default in the following
language:
"Q
Is that why you recorded a Notice of Interest
shortly after the default by Mrs. Malnar on the subject
property? Do you know what I am referring to?
"A
Yes. You're right. When we found out that the six
acres had gone back or we were defaulted, we were going
to put a Notice of Interest because we felt we still had
a claim on the property there.
"Q

You still claimed an interest in that property?

"A

Yes.

"Q
The whole 76-acre piece of property?
correct?
"A

Yes."

Is that

(T. 112) (Emphasis added.)

It was developed at trial that Eastern Utah Resources
was a partnership consisting of Ferron Elder and the four buyers
under the Contract of December 31, 1980, Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey
and Johnson, together with four other persons, including one
Darrell Didericksen. (T. 54-5)
On February 5, 1985, Ferron Elder conveyed the six
acres referred to in the Warranty Deed which had been recorded
by mistake on December 19, 1980, to the said Didericksen, and
that Deed was recorded April 17, 1985. (Ex. 23, T. 50)

Thereafter

Didericksen mortgaged the said six acres to Citizen's Bank for
$321,000 by Trust Deed dated January 17, 1985, and recorded
April 17, 1985. (Ex. 55)
On March 7, 1985, (over one year after the aforesaid
default) a Stipulation was entered into in the condemndation
action by the defendant and Elder, Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and
Johnson wherein it was stipulated as follows:
(1) That defendant Malnar was owner of all of the 76
acres, including the six acres.

(Defendant was not then aware

that the deed to the six acres had been delivered to Elder at
closing, nor of course that he had executed a deed thereto to
Didericksen the month before) (T. 242);

(2)

That Malnar was to receive all condemnation

proceeds; and
(3)

That plaintiffs retained the right to assert a

claim to equitable restitution of the monies forfeited under the
Real Estate Contract of December 19 f 1980. (Ex. 26)
Elder, Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and Johnson commenced
the present action in the District Court of Duchesne County for
alleged equitable restitution (R. 16), and on January 30, 1987,
assigned all of their interest in said lawsuit to the current
plaintiffs, Arvin L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup,
Lanis B. Dastrup, and A. Labrum & Sons. (Ex. 19)
The aforesaid condemnation action was tried to the
Court in Duchesne County and resulted in the taking by Deseret
Transmission of 5.21 acres (out of the said 76 acres) for its hightension power line which extended across the said 76 acres, and
defendant Malnar received compensation for the taking of that 5.21
acres in the total amount of $41,075.

Of this sum $9,075 was paid

to defendant Malnar in 1985, approximately one year after the Quitclaim Deed to the 76 acres was recorded, and $32,000 was paid to
her in 1986, approximately two years after the recording of said
Quit-claim Deed returning the property to her. (Ex's 16, 17, 26,
34;

T. 102-3, 64-5, 69, 113-15)
Defendant Malnar was required to expend $6,000 for

attorney's fees in prosecuting the condemnation action, so that
her net recovery for the taking of the 5.21 acres by Deseret

Transmission, after payment of fees and expenses, in the
condemnation action was $35,075. (Ex's 48, 50; T. 243-5)
As of the time of the recording of the said Quit-claim
Deed on February 3, 1984, an additional year's interest in the
amount o£ $10,247.80 had accrued and never was paid.
Prior to the recording of the Quit-claim Deed, real
estate taxes and water assessments had accrued in the amount of
$2,161.72, which buyers had failed to pay. (Ex. 20, Ex. 57)
The value of the land at the time of the recording of
the Quit-claim Deed back to Mrs. Malnar was disputed.

Witnesses

for the plaintiffs testified that the entire 76 acres was worth
$180,000, including the 5.21 acres taken in the condemnation.
(T. 168)

Defendant's witnesses testified that the said tract, not

including the 5.21 acres taken in the condemnation, was worth $700
to $800 per acre, but no more than $101,000, the balance due at
default. (T. 261-2)

Defendant's appraiser stated the value in

1985 (the time of the execution of the aforesaid stipulation,
Exhibit 26) was $1,400 per acre ($90,000 for 70 acres) and had
decreased steadily to the time of trial due to severe economic
decline in Duchesne County. (T. 340, 343)
The case was tried to the judge without a jury, being an
equity case, and at the conclusion of the trial the Court directed
that the parties make their closing arguments by memoranda, which
were duly submitted by the parties. (R. 48-127)

The Court then

rendered a Memorandum Decision (R. 163-9) dated April 7, 1988, and
entered April 20, 1988, in which the Court found the value of
the land at the time of its return to Mrs. Malnar to be $180,000
(R. 166), and found, based upon a "mutual mistake" theory that
the six acres at the time of the closing should have been removed
from the Contract and that it was therefore not properly included
in the Quit-claim Deed recorded by Mrs. Malnar on February 3,
1984, and found that said six acres was worth $30,000, and
therefore found that the balance of the land returned to Mrs.
Malnar, including the 5.21 acres taken in the condemnation action
was worth $150,000 ($180,000 less $30,000).
title to said six acres in plaintiffs.

The Court quieted

The Court did not explain

why it refused to honor the stipulation of the parties of March 7,
1985, where plaintiffs' predecessors declared that defendant owned
all of the 76 acres (including this 6-acre tract). (R. 166-7)
The Court declined to follow the rulings of the Supreme
Court in the case of Perkins v. Spencer, supra, and the numerous
Utah cases following it, but rather devised its own original
damage formula.

The Court rationalized that the balance owing on

the Contract at the time the Quit-claim Deed back to defendant
Malnar was recorded was $101,919.35, $50,080.65 having been paid
on principal.

The Court then concluded that the buyers owed an

additional year's interest to the seller at that time amounting to
$10,191.95, together with $1,774.52 in unpaid real property taxes

and water assessments, and therefore concluded that at the time
Mrs. Malnar received the property back from escrow, the buyers
owed her $113,885.82. (R. 168)
The Court then determined that the net amount received
by Mrs. Malnar from the condemnation of $35,075 ($41,075 less
attorney's fees of $6,000) should be applied against that balance,
as a payment on the Contract, notwithstanding $9,075 of said sum
was not received until a year after the Quit-claim Deed was
recorded, and the balance of $32,000 not received until two years
thereafter.

The Court then determined as noted above that the

value of the land which defendant received back was $150,000 and
concluded that Mrs. Malnar had therefore received $185,075 to
apply on the balance owing at the time the Quit-claim Deed was
returned to her, ($150,000 in land and $35,075 in condemnation
proceeds), and that she therefore had received an overpayment of
$71,189.18 (the $185,075 minus the balance of $113,885.22) and
awarded judgment to plaintiffs in said sum of $71,189.18 as
damages sustained by plaintiffs. (R. 168)
For the convenience of the court, we submit herewith a
summary of principal transactions with references to the exhibits
and a diagram showing those transactions.

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL TRANSACTIONS
Ex P5

Dec. 19, 1980

Real Estate Contract (76 acres)
Malnar to Elder

Ex Pll

Dec. 19, 1980

Warranty Deed to 6 acres
Recorded December 29, 1980

Ex D22

Dec. 19, 1980

Notice of Interest of Malnar-Elder
Contract, Recorded December 29, 1980

Ex P9

Dec. 31, 1980

Real Estate Contract (76 acres) Elder
to Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey, Johnson

Ex P40

Jan. 6, 1981

Ex P35

Oct. 18, 1982

Date of Condemnation

Ex D24

Feb. 25, 1983

Assignment by Elder to Eastern
Utah Resources—all his interest
in Malnar-Elder Contract;

Ex P10

Feb. 3, 1984

Quit-Claim Deed in escrow, Perron to
Malnar of 76 acres returned to Malnar
and recorded

Ex D24
& 54

Feb. 9, 1984

Notice of Interest, Eastern Utah Resources
Recorded February 14, 1984

Ex D23

Feb. 5, 1985

Warranty Deed, Elder to Didericksen
Recorded April 17, 1985 (6 acres)

Ex D55

Jan. 17, 1985

Trust Deed, Didericksen to Citizen's Bank,
6 acres, $321,000. (Recorded Apr 17, 1985)

Ex D26

Mar. 7, 1985

Stipulation, Malnar—Elder, Jenkins,
McCarver, Mabey & Johnson, as follows:
1. Malnar owns all of 76 acres;
2. Malnar to receive all condemnation
proceeds;
3. Plaintiffs retain right to assert
claim for restitution of forfeited sums.

Ex P19

Jan. 30, 1987

Assignment of current lawsuit from Elder,
Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey, Johnson to Arvin
L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis
Dastrup, Lanis B. Dastrup, A.Labrum & Sons

Notice of Interest to Elder-Jenkins
Contract (not recorded)

The principal transactions are diagramed as follows:
Malnar
Warranty Deed
6 acres
12-19-80
R. 12-29-80 V

R.E. Contract #1
76 acres
12-19-80

V

1980
Elder

1983

2-25-83

Elder

R.E. Contract #2
^ Jenkins
12-31-80
McCarver
Mabey
Johnson
(Ten in Common)

Assignment of buyers interest
in R.E. Contract #1

Eastern Utah Resources Partnership

Notice of Interest
2-9-84
v
(R.2-14-84)
To Whom It May Concern
(Never been released of record)
Malnar
1984
12-19-80 4 Q-C Deed
R.2-3-84
76 acres
Jenkins
McCarver
Mabey
Johnson

*f Elder

"^Elder
1985
W. Deed
6 acres
2-5-85
R.2-17-85
Didericksen
1987
2-17-87
Trust Deed
$321,000
Citizens Bank

i
3-7-85

Stip. that
Malnar owns
all 76 acres
Malnar

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE IN THE REAL ESTATE

CONTRACT IN QUESTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENFORCED BY THE COURT.
A liquidated damages clause is normally enforceable and
is unenforceable only if enforcement would allow an unconscionable
and exhorbitant recovery bearing no reasonable relationship to
actual damages.

This requires a comparison of the liquidated

damages with actual damages, and such a comparison in this case
shows that actual damages are far in excess of liquidated damages.
Thereforef the liquidated damages clause should have been enforced
by the lower Court.
Point II. THE COURT ERRED IN ANY EVENT IN DETERMINING
DAMAGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCTRINES OF PERKINS V. SPENCER AND
SUBSEQUENT UTAH CASES APPLYING THE SAME.
Instead of determining damages resulting to seller
through: (1) loss of advantageous bargain; (2) damage or
depreciation to the property; (3) any decline in value due to
change in market value of property not allowed in the foregoing
two items; and (4) for fair rental or interest accruing during the
period of occupancy (there were no improvements to the property
for which it would be fair to allow buyers any recovery) the Court
developed a damage theory of its own in which it determined the
value of the property forfeited at the time of forfeiture and
considered the return of the property to the seller as a payment
by the buyers and also considered moneys received by the seller
through eminent domain as to 5.21 acres of the property (said sums

having been received one and two years respectively after
forfeiture) as payments in effect on the property and charged
those to the seller.

The Court then found that defendant seller

had been overpaid and reimbursed buyers for the difference.

Such

treatment is not only not authorized by Perkins v. Spencer, but is
contrary to this court's ruling in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P2d
1244 (Utah 1987), and in effect requires a seller forfeiting the
buyer to "repurchase" the property from the buyer at present value
and effectively destroys the real estate contract and forfeiture
as a selling mechanism in Utah.

The Court's holding also

erroneously holds in effect that payments can be made on a
forfeited contract long after the contract has been forfeited.
POINT III. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RETURN OF THE
SIX-ACRE TRACT.
Paragraph 17 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex. 5)
provided that acreage could be released from the contract prior to
payment in full thereof upon payments of $3,000 per acre over and
above the regular payments made on the contract.
were made.

No such payments

Nevertheless, the Court erroneously quieted title in

plaintiffs to six acres.

Although the buyers have seriously

encumbered the property, the ownership thereof should have
been quieted in defendant.
POINT IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE VALUE OF

THE PROPERTY TO BE $180,000, RATHER THAN $98,000.
Although increase in value is irrelevant under Butler
v. Wilkinson, supra, defendant points out that the Court erred in

finding the value of the property to be $180,000, rather than
$98,000 for the following reasons: (1) The evidence overwhelmingly
showed that Duchesne suffered a severe economic reversal, that
that was the reason (together with the presence of a high-tension
wire which rendered the property unsuitable for residential
purposes) why the plaintiffs gave up the property; (2) Had the
property been worth $180,000, plaintiffs predecessors surely would
have sold it, rather than let it be forfeited; (3) Plaintiffs'
predecessors did not acquiesce in the forfeiture, but clouded the
title and asserted ownership until March 7, 1985, and thus the
valuation of the property should be determined at a date no sooner
than March 7, 1985; (4) If subdivision was not feasible for
plaintiffs1 predecessors, it certainly is not feasible for
defendant; and (5) The only believable testimony as that that
value was not more than $1,400 per acre or $98,000 total
ARGUMENT
The scope of review in this suit in equity for alleged
unconscionable forfeiture is that the court will review the
Findings and set them aside if they are clearly against the weight
of the evidence or the lower Court has misapplied proven facts,
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Ut 520, 94 P2d 465 (1939), and it is
established that this court should review and correct any inequity
and unjust award by the lower Court.
91 Ut 553, 63 P2d 277.
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LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE OF THE REAL- ESTATE CONTRACT.
11 1 Perkiru

neid a^ nna? 4/J.

' On the contrary, where enforcement of the
:.o.. laiture provisi on would allow an unconscionable and
exorbitant recovery,, bearing no reasonable relationship
to •: he actual, damage suffered, we have uniformly held it
to re unenforceable ,ff

In other words, if the amount forfeited (the
total amount paid by the buyer on the contract) is greatly
disproportionate to the actual damages suffered by the seller, the
forfeiture provision will not be enforced.

At page 476 of Perkins

v. Spencer the court sets forth the factors for determining the
actual damages as follows:
"The vendors are entitled to any loss occasioned
them by any of these factors:
"(1)
"(2)
property;

Loss of an advantageous bargain;
Any damage to or depreciation of the

"(3) Any decline in value due to change in market
value of the property not allowed for in items nos. 1
and 2; and
"(4) For the fair rental value of the property
during the period of occupancy.
"The total of such sums should be deducted from the
total amount paid in, plus any improvements for which it
would be fair to allow recovery, and any remaining
difference awarded to the plaintiffs."
The holding in Spencer v. Perkins has been affirmed
numerous times and is still the law in this state.

See for

example Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P2d 562 (Utah 1985), Cole v.
Parker, 5 Ut 2d 263, 300 P2d 623 (1956), and Jensen v. Nielsen,
260 Ut 2d 96, 485 P2d 673 (1971).
Indeed, in Jensen v. Nielsen, supra, the Supreme Court
said in support of the use of a liquidated damages clause:
"The forfeiture provision usually included in such real
estate contracts has the entirely legitimate objectives:

of putting pressure on the buyer to make his payments
and keep the covenants of the contract; and the
concomitant protection of the seller. This facilitates
and encourages time-payment real estate transactions by
enabling a purchaser to acquire property on such a
contract; and it enables the seller to cooperate in that
purpose by assuring him that through proper procedure he
can reclaim his property in case the buyer fails to
perform.
"If at any time this happens the law would require
an accounting as advocated by the plaintiffs, the
advantages above mentioned would be lost. Furthermore,
inasmuch as in the event trouble develops the court
would take over and fashion another contract for the
parties anyway, the right of contract would be seriously
impaired. Consequently there would be little point in
the parties giving much concern to negotiating their
contract in the first place. But the law does not do
this. Even if it be true that in some exigencies the
courts refuse to enforce such forfeitures, before this
is done, there is an essential predicate which first
must be found to exist: the circumstances must be such
that if the forfeiture were applied, it would be so
grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view of
loss that might have been contemplated by the parties,
that it would so shock the conscience that a court of
equity would refuse to enforce such forfeiture."
Therefore, in determining whether or not the liquidated
damages clause is to be enforced, it is necessary to determine
seller's actual damages under Spencer v. Perkins, which we set
forth as follows:
LOSS OF ADVANTAGEOUS BARGAIN.
The first inquiry is to whether there has been a loss
of an advantageous bargain.

This involves a determination as to

whether or not the value of the land returned to the seller is
less than the contract balance at the time of forfeiture or at
such later time as is equitable.

The original contract price was

$152,000; the amount paid on principal was $50,080.46, leaving a

contract balance of $101,919.54. Defendant's witnesses testified
that the value of the property returned to the defendant did not
exceed $98,000, which, if believed, would yield a loss of bargain
to the defendant of $3,919.54. Plaintiffs' witnesses testified
that the value of the land returned was $180,000.

The lower court

determined that the defendant was not entitled to the return of
the six acres, which the Court valued at $30,000, and therefore
reduced the $180,000 figure to $150,000. Plaintiffs are not
entitled to credit for any increase in the value fo the property
at the time of forfeiture, if indeed there were any increase in
value, and therefore defendant's loss of advantageous bargain is
either $3,919.54 if defendant's witnesses are believed, or zero
if plaintiffs' witnesses are believed.
No one disputes that had the plaintiffs' predecessors
fully performed their contract, they would have been entitled to a
conveyance of the property and to the benefit of any increase in
value.

See Utah State Medical Association v. Utah State Employees

Credit Union, 655 P2d 643 (Utah 1982).

If the purchaser, however,

does not perform and his interest is forfeited, then the purchaser
loses the benefit of any appreciated value of the property over
the contract price.

This court specifically so held in Butler v.

Wilkinson, supra, where the court stated at page 1256:
"A vendee, however, is entitled to the appreciated
value of the property over the contract purchase price
as long as his or her interest has not been forfeited."
(Emphasis added.)

The court stated at page 1257 of the opinion:
"Since the sales price to the Christensens exceeded
the value of the Wilkinsons1 vendors1 security interest
by $186,300, that amount was the value of Themy's equity
interest subject to the judgment creditors1 liensf if
Themy's property interest was not terminated,"
In that case the court held that the seller's forfeiture
was not bona fide and held thatf had the seller retained the
property, liens would have attached.

The court found, however,

that the property had been purchased from the seller by a third
party who purchased in good faith and without notice, and
therefore held that the liens of judgment creditors were
unenforceable in any event.
In the instant case the forfeiture is not disputed, and
in fact is insisted upon by the buyers, and the lower Court found
a forfeiture (see paragraphs 10, 15 and 26 of the Findings)

It is

therefore clear that under the Butler case the plaintiffs were not
entitled to be credited with the increased value of the property,
if any.
There has been no Utah case, nor any case whatever,
so far as defendant is aware, where the defaulting buyer has
been awarded the value of the land forfeited in excess of the
balance owing.

In several Utah cases the value of the land

returned exceeded the contract value, but that did not entitle the
buyer to reimbursement in said amount, but merely indicated that
there was no damage to the seller by reason of loss in market

value.

For example, in Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P2d 1082 (Utah 1983) at

page 1085 we read:
"The plaintiff produced no evidence that the
property had diminished in value, Mr. Ridd, one of the
buyers, testified that when he and his wife vacated the
property was worth a substantial amount more than the
contract price of $57,500."
If a seller is liable to a forfeited buyer for the
excess of the value of land over the purchase price, then a buyer
in a market where prices are rising can immediately defauLt
without making any further payments, and the forfeiting seller
will have to reimburse the buyer for the value of the land in
excess of the purchase price.

We respectfully submit that that

has never been the law.
In Warner v. Rasmussen, supra, the buyer sought recovery
of the value of improvements made to the property.

Perkins v.

Spencer does suggest that in a proper case the cost (not value) of
improvements to the property might be reimbursable to the buyer.
In Warner the buyer argued that the value of the property had not
diminished during buyer's occupancy and that therefore he was
entitled to reimbursement for the improvements.

The Supreme Court

affirmed the finding of the lower court that even with the improvements the value of the property did not exceed the contract price.
In Kay v. Wood, 549 P2d 709 (Utah 1976), the lower court
found that the buyer had made improvements to the property in the
amount of $5,802.30, that the property was worth $7,000 more at
forfeiture than the contract price and allowed the buyer damages

against the seller in the sum of $4,663.05. The Supreme Court
affirmed on the basis that no transcript had been provided,
declining to look behind the findings in such a case.

The Supreme

Court said that without a transcript "we cannot determine whether
or not it was error for the court below to conclude that it was
unconscionable for the plaintiff to retain all of the payments and
the value of the improvements made." (Emphasis added.)

The case

would thus not seem to be much support for any proposition, but at
most would only support the view that the cost (not value) of
improvements in a proper case may be reimbursed to buyer to the
extent that the value of the land at forfeiture exceeds the
contract price.
In the instant case there were no improvements to the
property, and thus plaintiffs were entitled to no reimbursement
even if the value of the land had in fact increased over the
original purchase price.
DAMAGE TO OR DEPRECIATION OF THE PROPERTY
The next point to consider is whether there has been any
damage to, or depreciation of, the property.

It is undisputed

that the six-acre tract has never been returned to the defendant.
The lower Court held that the plaintiffs were not
required to return the six acres, quieted title to the said six
acres in plaintiffs, found that said property was worth $30,000
and allowed defendant credit for that $30,000. Defendant does not
quarrel with the fact that she is at least entitled to credit for

the said $30r000f but does claim that the Court erred in quieting
title therein in plaintiffs.

The matter of the return of the said

six acres is discussed in Point III hereafter.
Also, that land was damaged in connection with the
eminent domain proceedings, part of which was not reimburse^ to
defendant, and she is entitled'to be credited with that sum here,
to-wit,

$6,000 attorneys' fees she was required to pay her

attorneys in the eminent domain action.
As noted above, defendant, upon forfeiture, was entitled
to return of all of the land before there could be any possibility
of any reimbursement to plaintiffs.

Since a portion of the 76

acres (5.21 acres) was taken by condemnation, defendant was
obviously entitled to the condemnation proceeds to take the place
of the lost land.

As those condemnation proceeds to defendant

were reduced by the amount of the attorneys' fees defendant had to
pay to get them, she is entitled to reimbursement for those fees.
If plaintiffs' predecessors had not defaulted, they would have had
to pay the attorneys' fees from the land taken from them, but
would still have had to pay defendant the full agreed purchase
price.

When they defaulted, as between plaintiffs' predecessors

and defendant, plaintiffs' predecessors had the duty to return all
of the land without any deduction therefrom for attorney's fees,
and thus defendant was entitled to the condemnation proceeds
without any deduction threfrom for attorneys' fees.

Having paid

the $6,000 from said proceeds, it is an element of damages to her.

Plaintiffs' predecessors had done some planning for a
subdivision (which was the purpose for which they intended to use
the property).

Some earth work had been done, but there was no

cement work, paving or structures erected on the land.

The

potential for a subdivision evaporated with the economic reversal
in Duchesne County.

Defendant testified that the only use for the

land was agrcultural and that it would cost $30,000 to restore the
property to agricultural use. (T. 253-4, 368)

Defendant has thus

been damaged $30,000 in necessary restoration fees.

Cost of

restoration was approved as a proper element of damage in
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P2d 371 (Utah 1977).
DECLINE IN VALUE DUE TO CHANGE IN MARKET VALUE NOT
ALLOWED FOR IN THE FOREGOING ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE.
There would appear to be no decline in value due to
change in market value not allowed for in the preceding items.
INTEREST OR FAIR RENTAL VALUE.
This brings us to the fair rental value of the property
or interest during the period of occupancy.

Although Perkins v.

Spencer talks in terms of rental value, subsequent Utah cases have
approved the use of interest as an appropriate measure of damage
for use of the premises, and this is the measure used by the lower
Court.

See Biesinqer v. Behunin, 584 P2d 801 (Utah 1978), and

Jacobsen v. Swan, 3 Ut 2d 59, 278 P2d 294 (1954).
Plaintiffs1 predecessors paid $26,059.90 interest, which
the defendant was obviously entitled to retain, and an additional

year's interest accrued from February 1983 to February 1984 in the
amount of $10,247.80, which was never paid and which was allowed
by the lower court as a credit to defendant.

In addition,

defendant contends that she was entitled to interest from February
1984 when she asserted forfeiture until the Stipulation was signed
on March 7, 1985, (Ex. 26) because until that date plaintiffs'
predecessors contested the forfeiture and clouded the title with
their Notice of Interest recorded February 14, 1984. The amount
of interest from February 1984 until March 7, 1985 would be
$10,674.79.
Case law supports the proposition that the seller should
have a reasonable time after return of the property to repair and
resell the property, and the seller should be allowed the recovery
of interest for that time period.

In the case of Cole v. Parker,

supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that seller, as one element of
damage, is entitled to an amount equal to the difference between
the contract price and the price "for which he can sell the
forfeited property."

The Court said:

"Thus, in the absence of a finding of fraud, the
seller is entitled to be credited, in the computation of
damage sustained because of the breach of the contract,
the difference between the contract price and the price
for which he can sell the forfeited property."
This same wording is used in Park Valley Corp. v.
Bagley, 635 P2d 65 (Utah 1981) at page 67.
That implies a consideration of factors other than fair
market value alone.

It takes into consideration the practical

problems faced by the seller as he attempts to dispose of the
property he is forced to take back, and in addition to including a
time element for resale, should take into consideration the state
of the title as it relates to marketability.

In this case the six

acres is certainly not marketable, and the 70 acres was not
marketable because of the Notice of Interest, at least until the
Stipulation (Ex. 26), and in fact is not marketable to this date
until the record interest of Eastern Utah Resources is terminated.
In Jensen v. Nielsen, supra, the Supreme Court stated:
"In addition to the foregoing, it is without
dispute that the best offer for the property after plaint
iffs1 occupancy was $5,000 less than plaintiffs had
agreed to pay for it. Thus defendants were entitled to
credit for that additional amount as loss of favorable
bargain, or as diminution in value."
It seems clear that before the court can grant
equitable relief to a defaulting buyer, it must see that equity is
administered to the seller as well.

In administering equity the

court is required to look to the realities and the essential
fairness of the situation with respect to resale.
In Carlson v. Carlson, 8 Ut 2d 272, 332 P2d 989 (1958),
in pointing out that that case did not involve unconscionability
within the requirements of Perkins v. Spencer, supra, the Supreme
Court of Utah stated:
"The amount of damages here was but 9i% of the purchase
price, an amount that would exceed but little the real
estate commission that would have to be paid on resale
of the property that defendants took back without fault
on their part, from those who caused all the difficulty
by breaking the contract.

"The two cases are poles apart, the one obviously
being punctuated by unconscionability, the other
appearing to call only for the exaction of a reasonably
small percentage of the price for a breach that would
cause delay for repairs, time lapse for re-salef and
possible other items of damage susceptible of little but
conjectural measurement." (Emphasis added.)
It appears clear*-that time lapse for repair and resale
is a valid element of damages, and the court can and should allow
at least one year in this case based upon the need for restoration
time and expense coupled with the poor economic climate in
Duchesne County.

For such one-year time period the plaintiffs

would owe additional interest of $10,247.80.
Finally, defendant was required to pay taxes and water
assessment which accrued before forfeiture, but were not paid by
plaintiffs1 predecessors, in the sum of $1,521.52 taxes and $640
water assessment. (Ex. 57 and Ex. 20)

In Finding No. 19 the Court

allowed a total of $1,774.52 for these items, but the correct
amount is $2,161.72, and failure to allow the full amount is
assigned as error and is apparently just an oversight.
Total damages as discussed above are set forth in
summary as follows:
Loss of bargain
Damage to or depreciation
to property
Loss of six acres
restoration cost to land
Unreimbursed attorneys f
fees, eminent domain

$ 3,919.54*

30,000.00
30,000.00
6,000.00

Interest paid to 1-29-82
Interest paid to 2-1-83
Unpaid interest
Feb. 1983 to Feb. 1984
(to date of forfeiture)
Feb. 1984 to Mar. 7, 1985
(extra interest to date
when plaintiffs1 predecessors
acknowledged forfeiture)
Mar. 7 1985 to Mar. 7, 1986
(interest during reasonable
repair and resale period)
Taxes and water assessments
Total damages

13,991.37
12,118.53
10f247.80
10f264.79

10,247.80
2,161.72
$128,951.55*

(*Total damages would be $125,032.01 if plaintiffs witnesses
were believed on the question of value ($128,951.55 less
$3,919.54.)
Total interest and principal paid
by plaintiffs' predecessors

76,240.36

Excess of actual damages over
liquidated damages

$52,711.19

It is thus clear that actual damages exceed liquidated
damages by $52,711.19, and therefore the liquidated damages1
provision should be enforced.
POINT II.

IN ANY EVENT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING

TO DETERMINE DAMAGES UNDER THE DOCTRINE ANNOUNCED IN PERKINS V.
SPENCER AND SUBSEQUENT UTAH CASES APPLYING THAT DOCTRINE.
The trial Court in the instant case failed to follow the
holding of Perkins v. Spencer in any case. The Court reasoned in
its Memorandum Decision that the Court should determine the
balance owing to the seller on the contract at the time of the
default, and that the Court should apply against that balance as a
payment thereon the value of the land being returned to the seller

and also should apply against that balance as a payment thereon
(Finding 18) the amount received by the seller over a year after
forfeiture as compensation for the take in the eminent domain case
and then award the "overpayment" to the buyer.

This theory of

damages (Judge Bunnell's own original theory) was Finding 25 and
is manifest error.
It appears that plaintiffs realized that the Court's
analysis was in error and that it was totally at variance with
Perkins and Spencer, so plaintiffs attempted to restructure the
Court's figures so that they appeared to be in the form of Perkins
v. Spencer, but that restructuring is wholly illusory and equally
erroneous.

This version of damages was included in the proposed

Findings as Finding 24, and was objected to by defendant in the
court below and here, but the objection below was summarily
rejected by the Court without even allowing oral argument.

This

paragraph 24 version of damages purports to first determine the
total amounts paid on the contract.

It includes the principal

paid of $50,130.46 and the interest paid of $26,059.90, but then
adds to said sums the $35,075 paid in the eminent domain case as
though it were a payment by buyer paid on the contract.

As noted,

the amount paid in the eminent domain case was paid over a year
after the default, was not paid by the plaintiffs in any event,
but rather by Deseret Transmission in the eminent domain case, and
was paid as compensation for the taking of 5.21 acres of land,
which has never been returned to the seller—and never will be-

-and represents land permanently taken.

The eminent domain money

stands in the place of the land defendant was entitled to receive
back, and seller is not chargeable therewith any more than if she
had received the land back.
plaintiffs1 predecessors.

It is in no sense money paid by

This is the first major error in the

paragraph 24 version of damages.
The paragraph 24 version then goes on to purportedly
determine the actual damages sustained by seller.

It allows as

damages the interest paid on the contract of $26,059.90 and allows
an extra year of unpaid interest which accrued between February 1,
1983, and February 3, 1984, of $10,247.80, and allows seller
$1,774.52 for unpaid taxes and water assessments, but then comes
another major error.

The Court purports to allow defendant $2,000

damages for loss of bargain by comparing the original purchase
price of $152,000 with the finding that the land was worth
$150,000 when it was returned to defendant.

This presumably is

based upon the Court's determination that the whole tract was
worth $180,000 when it was returned to defendant, but that since
the six-acre tract was not returned by buyer, the figure of
$180,000 is reduced by $30,000 to reach the $150,000 figure.
Such treatment is error.
Under Perkins v. Spencer the seller is entitled to be
credited with any loss resulting from "damage to or depreciation
of the property."

Since the six acres was not returned to seller,

defendant is entitled to be credited with the $30,000 as a direct

deduction from the $50f130.46 paid on the contract by buyer.

In

other wordsf if the buyer is not required to return the six acres,
then $30f000 worth of the $50,130.46 paid on principal should be
assigned to that six acres which was never returned, meaning that
plaintiffs have only paid $20,130.46 on the remaining 70 acres.
It is improper for the Court to deduct that $30,000 damage item
from an inflated valuation figure of $180,000, or any valuation
figure, and then erroneously conclude that seller has received
credit for failure to return the six acres in that manner.
Perkins v. Spencer does not require seller to give credit to
the buyer if the value of the land when returned has increased
in value.

If there has been an increase in the value of the land,

it merely means that seller does not get credit for any actual
damages for loss of bargain.

As held by this court in Butler v.

Wilkinson, supra, buyer on forfeiture loses the benefit of any
increase in value.
Perkins v. Spencer and Butler v. Wilkinson do not
require the seller in effect to buy the property back from the
buyer if the value of the land has increased.

It is therefore

manifest error for the Court to deny defendant credit for damages
for the value of property never returned by deducting such value
from the supposed increase in the value of the land.

If the Court

cannot directly charge the seller with the increased value of the
land over the contract price (and thus require, in effect, that
the seller buy the property back from the buyer at the increased

value)f the Court cannot indirectly do the same thing by deducting
the seller's loss (accruing to seller from the six acres never
returned) from the supposed increase in valuation in the land.
The same is true of the $30f000 restoration cost.

In effect, the

trial Court is saying that he will not allow defendant any damages
from the six acres which have never been returned to her or from
the destruction to the land done by the bulldozer because the rest
of the land that she got back is worth more than it was when she
sold it.

In other words, under this theory, the buyer can damage,

destroy, or even sell off parcels of the land covered by the
contract if the remnant returned to the seller has increased in
value enough to offset the carnage.

This would allow the buyer to

burn down the improvements on property or physically remove them
and sell them off with inpunity if the value of the land remaining
was equal to the balance owing on the contract.
By requiring the seller to pay the defaulting party the
excess value of the land over the balance owing at default, the
Court is requiring the seller to buy back the land from the buyers
and rewarding the defaulting party because the buyers don't even
have to go looking for a buyer or pay a commission.
That theory is not the doctrine of Perkins v. Spencer
and is directly contrary to Butler v. Wilkinson, and is error.
For the convenience of the court we desire to summarize
damages computed under Judge Bunnell's theory of damages and
plaintiffs' attempted restructuring of this same erroneous theory

for comparison with what we believe to be the correct computation
of damages under Perkins v. Spencer as set out at the end of Point
I.
I.

Judge Bunnell's theory of damages
(Page 6 of Memorandum Decision and incorporated in
substance as paragraph 25 of Findings of Fact)
"The Court has reached the following factual analysis:
Balance owing on Contract
Additional interest owing
to date of forfeiture
Taxes and assessments paid

-

$101,919.35
10,191.95

-

1,774.52

Total due Malnar
Amount received by Malnar
from condemnation
Value of land received
after forfeiture

-

35,075.00

-

150,000.00

Total
Amount actually received
Amount of damage suffered

113,885.82

-

185,075.00
185,075.00
113,885.82
$ 71,189.18"

II. Theory of damages included in the Findings as Finding No. 24
by plaintiffs' counsel and adopted by the Court as an alternate
theory of damages:
Principal paid by Elder on contrct
Interest paid by Elder on contract
Eminent domain proceeds paid by
Deseret Transmission
Total

$ 50,130.46
26,059.50
35,075.00
111,265.36

Damages sustained by defendant
Interest paid
Interest accrued, but unpaid
Unpaid taxes and water assessment
Difference between contract price of
$152,000 and value of property returned
Total
Difference awarded to plaintiffs

26,059.90
10,247.60
1,774.52
2,000.00
40,082.22
$71,183.14

The only real difference in the two calculations is
that the first talks in terms of balance owing to the seller as
seller's damage and purports to "overpay" this damage with the
condemndation money and "increased" value of the land.

The second

calculation involves comparing amounts supposedly paid on the
contract against seller's damages (which is the form of Perkins
v. Spencer), but the same errors are perpetuated by considering
condemnation money as a payment and by failing to show loss of
the six acres as damages to the seller.
It is important to note that even limiting our
consideration to the items allowed by the lower Court, but
correctly structuring them within the framework of Perkins v.
Spencer, there is still no justification for failing to enforce
the liquidated damages clause.

We review the case in this light

for the purpose of demonstrating that, even assuming for the sake
of argument the correctness of that finding, the Court's analysis
of damages is still wholly erroneous.
Perkins v. Spencer (but using the lower Court's Findings only)
Total principal paid on contract
Total interest paid on contract
Total

$50,130.46
26,059.90
76,190.36

Actual damages
Loss of bargain
Damage or depreciation to
property (six acres)
Decline in market value
not allowed above

-0- *
30,000.00
-0-

Interest paid
Interest accrued, but unpaid
Unpaid taxes and water assessment

26f059.90
10,247.80
1,774,52

Total

68,082.22

Difference $

8,108.14

The difference between liquidated damages and actual
damages is thus no more than $8,108.14 even using the lower
Court's figures, which represents .5.3% of the total purchase
price, and even this difference is not unconscionable.

The

Court stated in Biesinger v. Behunin, supra:
"Adding these attorneys1 fees to the rent figure of
$18,900 we see that plaintiffs1 actual damages are
within $8,612 of that amount agreed upon by the parties
as liquidated damages in the event of breach. We do not
deem that amount to be unreasonable, unconscionable, or
in the nature of a penalty, particularly in view of the
fact that it represents only 9i% of the purchase price
of $90,000.00. Consequently, we decline to alter the
terms of the contract."
Furthermore, the total of the eminent domain proceeds
received by defendant was $41,075.

Defendant had to spend $6,000

for attorneys' fees to obtain that recovery.

Even the trial Court

acknowledged this when it charged defendant with receipt of
$35,075, rather than $41,075.

If this $6,000 is deducted from the

figure of $8,108.14, it leaves a difference of only $2,108.14,
which clearly is not an unconscionable difference.
NO PAYMENT POSSIBLE ON TERMINATED CONTRACT
The Court is treating the contract as though it were
still alive, even after forfeiture.

I* the contract has been

forfeited, it ceased to exist and is dead.

No further payments

can be made on it. To further compound the error the Court is
treating the eminent domain proceeds as though they too were a
payment on the contract, although the eminent domain proceeds were
not received until long after the contract waa-forfeited and could
in nowise be considered payment on the contract.

[$9f075 was paid

in 1985 (Ex. 26), a year after forfeiture, and $32,000 in 1986,
two years after forfeiture. (Ex. 16)]
Had this case come on for trial after forfeiture, but
before condemnation proceeds were paid to the defendant, the Court
would have been unable to grant plaintiffs credit for an eminent
domain payment.

It is obvious that the determination of

plaintiffs1 rights have nothing to do with the payment of the
condemnation money.

The rights between the parties were fixed at

the time of forfeiture and cannot be affected by what happens
thereafter.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of a

"generous" factfinder in the condemnation action, nor will they be
penalized by a "conservative" one.

Numerous cases have held that

once the property is forfeited and returned to the seller, the
buyer is not entitled to any credit for amounts which the seller
thereafter receives from the property.

See 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor

and Purchaser, Section 503, and annotation at 31 ALR 2d 8 at page
128.

See also Sanders v. Brock, 230 Penn 609, 79 A. 772 (1911).
In Finding of Fact No. 9, which defendant assigns as

error, the Court found that on January 30, 1987, plaintiffs1

predecessors assigned to plaintiffs "all of their right, title and
interest in and to the real estate contract with Malnar and the
seventy-six (76) acres described therein."

That finding

demonstrates that the Court felt that as recently as 1987 the real
estate contract was still alive as some interst in the land is
still subject to being conveyed in the Court's mind.

In fact, the

assignment (Ex. 19) only purports to assign the "claims"made in
this action.
UTAH EMINENT DOMAIN LAW SUPPORTS DEFENDANT
Under Utah law the buyer was entitled to the
condemnation money as of the date of condemnation, subject to the
sellerfs right to remain secured.

See Jelco v. Third District

Court, 29 Ut 2d 472, 511 P2d 739 (1973).

Forfeiture of the land

takes back all rights of the buyer, including that one.

Even if

buyer, before forfeiture, were willing to apply the condemnation
money as a payment on the contract, he couldn't apply it until he
got it.

It was not paid to the defendant until 1985 and 1986, one

and two years respectively after the contract was forfeited.
If the lower Court is saying that the contract is
somehow kept alive until a year or more after forfeiture so that
the eminent domain money can be treated as a payment on the
contract, then the contract by definition is alive after the
forfeiture and there is no forfeiture.
Eminent domain is meant to compensate for a taking or
for a burden imposed upon property.

While it is true that the

eminent domain action was started before the forfeiture, that only
means that the buyer (while he is still buyer) is entitled to any
damage done to the land through eminent domain since the buyer
will be the ultimate owner of the land which will continue to be
burdened.

Where, however, there is a forefeiture, it is then the

seller who takes the land back, who is thus burdened by the use
imposed through eminent domain, and therefore seller is entitled
to the proceeds, and since the burden imposed is not a part of any
purchase agreement, but is rather an "injury" to the land, so to
speak, by a third party, the proceeds of eminent domain cannot be
considered in any sense as purchase price, and this is true, not
only because it is the seller who gets the burdened land back,
rather than the buyer, but also because the forfeited buyer is not
returning the entire tract whole.
he purchased.

He is not returning everything

He is returning "damaged goods," and he isn't

entitled to full credit for the land returned because it is
damaged.

It is axiomatic that the seller must receive back what

he sold before he is required to refund anything to the seller.
Any violation of that axiom would seem to be violation of due
process.
In the eminent domain action Judge Davidson awarded
compensation for the 5.21 acres taken, he also awarded a severance
damage reflecting damage done to the remaining acreage, all of
which is now, and for so long as she owns it, a burden upon the
defendant, Mrs. Malnar.

It is also a burden which will be passed

on to future buyers and will negatively effect the purchase price
as compared to land not so burdened.

This severance damage was

based upon the theory of cost to cure and is an expense Mrs.
Malnar must go to in order to, in effect, rehabilitate her land,
and can't be construed as part of any purchase price to defendant.
The eminent domain proceeds stand in the place of the land taken
or destroyed.

They rightfully belong to whomever the land should

have been returned to.

If this money had been paid to the buyer

before forfeiture, then it would have belonged to the buyer
(subject to the requirement that the seller be properly secured),
and the buyer could presumably have elected to use it to make a
payment on the contract, and under Perkins v. Spencer that payment
would be reflected as a payment made by the buyer, but would
likewise be reflected as damage to the property as seller would be
getting back less than he sold, whereas on forfeiture he should
get the land back in its original condition.

In effect there

would be a "wash" as the extra payment would be offset by the
damage to the property.

This is as it should be as the seller

in that event would have been paid with his own land, and buyer
should have no credit for that.
If the money had been paid to the buyer before
forfeiture and buyer did not apply it on the contract, then under
Perkins v. Spencer buyer will not be credited with a payment, but
will be charged with damage to the land (since seller is not
getting back what she sold) and this will be reflected in a

judgment for loss of bargain for seller.

These computations are

not necessarily mathematically exact as there may be other factors
involved, but are at least illustrative.
In any event, after forfeiture, buyer would have no
right to the condemnation money as Buyer is no longer owner of the
property.

Furthermore, by virtue of the Stipulation (Ex. 26), the

parties agreed that the condemnation proceeds would be the sole
property of the defendant.

When the Court gives the plaintiffs

credit for the eminent domain proceeds in its computations, the
Court is rewriting the 1985 Stipulation.
POINT III.

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RETURN OF THE

SIX-ACRE TRACT.
In Findings of Fact Nos. 20, 21 and 22 the Court found
that plaintiffs were entitled to the six acres, and those findings
are assigned as error.
The Real Estate Contract provides in paragraph 17:
"Upon payment of the sum of $3,000 in addition to
the annual payments herein required, Seller agrees to
release one-acre lots. The releases will be upon
approval to Bull Valley Resources of Denver, Colorado.
Buyer shall receive credit for all sums paid for lot
releases on the last payments to become due. It is not
intended that said $3,000 per acre should be extra
consideration, but merely early payment for early
release of the lot." (Emphasis added.)
It is therefore clear that the parties agreed that if
buyer made extra payment over and above the specified annual
payments, he would receive a release of acreage at the rate of
$3,000 per acre.

It is undisputed that no extra payments were

made, and defendant was therefore never entitled to release of
any acreage.

It is thus clear that the deed to the six acres

was to have been held in escrow until paid for, but that it was
erroneously recorded by the escrow agent shortly after closing.
It should further be noted that at the time the
Stipulation was entered into (Ex. 26), the parties agreed in
paragraph 1 thereof:
"that Marvel Malnar is the record owner of that certain
real property involved in the above-entitled action to
which the aforenamed defendants are parties, the real
property being more particularly described as . . . "
The legal description is then set forth, and it includes the sixacre tract.

It is thus clear that the parties never intended any

release of acreage until additional consideration was paid, and as
it never was paid, the parties agreed that defendant was entitled
to return of the six acres. Although requested, the Court refused
to find that the Stipulation of March 7, 1985, confirmed title to
the six acres in defendant, and such failure is also assigned as
error. (R. 189)
In fact, several weeks before the Stipulation was
signed, plaintiffs' predecessor, Ferrin Elder, deeded the six-acre
tract to Didericksen, who in turn encumbered it with the bank for
a loan in excess of $300,000.

It is therefore clear that the six

acres has not been returned intact and that it has been damaged or
depreciated significantly.
It was testified that at least $5,000 would have to be
expended in attorney's fees to conduct a quiet-title action with

respect to said six acres.

In view of the depressed market

conditions in Duchesne, it is questionable that the value of the
six acres, if it can be obtained, would at the present time exceed
the $5,000 attorney's fees by very much.

The lower court held

that the six acres was not subject to return to the defendant, and
the trial court quieted title thereto in the plaintiffs and fixed
its value at $30,000.
One thing is clear, and that is that the six acres has
been virtually totally destroyed, and plaintiffs are chargeable
therewith.

Either the land has been deeded away, and is gone, or

is severely encumbered, and the cost to defendant will be very
nearly its actual value in the depressed market of Duchesne
County.

Still it is clear that it was not to have been released,

and the Court should award it to defendant for whatever she may be
able to hereafter do with it.
The original deed placed in escrow covered the entire 76
acres and thus included the six-acre tract.

This clearly shows

that the six acres was not intended to be released at that time.
There is no basis for a finding of mutual mistake in those facts.
There is no showing in the evidence that defendant ever agreed to
release the six acres without compensation, nor that she agreed to
an escrowed deed from buyer for less than 76 acres. Until she was
paid for the extra six acres, it was as subject to forfeiture as
was the rest of the tract.

Had buyer paid for the six acres, than

at the time of the release of the six acres, the Quit-claim Deed

could and would have been corrected.
six acres was never paid for.

This never happened as the

The only mistake was that the deed

was prematurely and erroneously recorded.
An effort was made to get defendant to agree to a
release of six acres without extra consideration prior to closing
and a modifying Earnest Money Agreement with such provision was
prepared dated December 18, 1980, but rejected by the defendant.
(Ex. 4; T. 283)
At closing the next day it was apparently signed at
the same time as the Real Estate Contract (Ex. 5), but defendant
testified she did not know she had signed it.

It was placed in

front of her and she thought it was just another closing document.
The Real Estate Contract expressed her intent. (T. 283)

By its

own terms (line 43) the Earnest Money was abrogated by execution
of the final Real Estate Contract.

The final contract also varied

from the "Earnest Money" in payment terms.
The lower Court in Findings of Fact Nos. 3, 4, 5 and
6 purported to find that the earnest money was entered into on
December 18f 1980, and led up to the final contract, but those
findings are also assigned as error by defendant.

The undisputed

testimony was that the document was not signed until December 19/
1980f and although the date line by defendant's signature is
blank, the document is dated the 19th in the botton "receipt"
section.

POINT IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE VALUE OF THE

PROPERTY TO BE $180f000, RATHER THAN $98,000.
In Finding No. 17 the Court found the 76 acres to have
a fair market value of $180,000 at default in February 1984, and
that finding is assigned as error.
The value of the land is irrelevant unless it is less
than the contract price so that the seller can show that he has
suffered a loss of bargain.

As heretofore pointed out, if the

value of the land happens to increase during the pendency of the
contract, buyer is not entitled to the benefit of that increase
where the property is forfeited.

See Butler v. Wilkinsen, supra.

Accordingly, any increase in the value of the land is irrelevant.
If the Court, however, should find any other relevance to an
increase in the value of the property, defendant desires to point
out that the Court erred in finding the property to be worth
$180,000 in the first place.
This being an equity case, this court on appeal can make
its own findings of fact as to value. We respectfully submit that
the evidence and particularly the following facts compel a finding
that the property was not worth more than $98,000:
1.

The evidence overwhelmingly shows that Duchesne

County suffered a severe economic reversal, and in fact that is
the reason that the sellers decided not to proceed with the
purchase.

Had the price of the land in reality gone up, ^uyers

would have held on to the same and sold it at a profit.

The very

fact that they let it go to forfeiture when they had the economic
ability to make payments shows that the property had severely
decreased in value.
2.

Plaintiffs1 predecessors refused to acquiesce in

the forfeiture, filed a Notice of Interest against the property,
and claimed ownership thereof until March 7, 1985, the correct
time for determining value is no sooner than March 7, 1985.
Plaintiffs submitted no testimony as to the value at that time
and failed to sustain their burden of proof.
3.

The property is still burdened with a Notice of

Interest in favor of "Eastern Utah Resources Partnership, which
plaintiffs1 witnesses failed to take into consideration in
arriving at their value of $180,000, and said value unquestionably
constitutes an encumbrance against the property.

The burden of

proof for showing that actual damages are less than liquidated
damages is upon the party so asserting, in this case the
plaintiffs, and they have failed to so show.
4.

In attempting to establish a higher value for the

property plaintiffs contended that the property was still able to
be subdivided, but contended' that it was not economically feasible
for them to do so. Plaintiffs did not explain, nor did the Court
make any finding, as to how it would be economically feasible for
defendant to subdivide the property when it wasn't so for the
plaintiffs.

Defendant and her experts testified that the property

has reverted in feasibility to an agricultural use only.

Defendant testified that as of trial she had filed for Green Belt
and made application for federal participation in an irrigation
system. (T. 253-4)

Defendant's cost for putting in such a system

as indicated by both the defendant's husband and Mr. West, the
appraiser called on behalf of the defendant, was $30,000. (T. 368)
It is clear that the plaintiffs filed their Notice of
Interest on the property and refused to release the same until a
Stipulation was entered into March 7, 1985, for the reason that
they wanted to be able to leap either direction.

If the economic

situation improved, they no doubt would have asserted that the
forfeiture was invalid.

When in March 1985 it appeared that the

economic situation was getting progressively worse, plaintiffs
apparently elected to abandon the property and try to obtain
damages under Perkins v. Spencer.

The only basis upon which

plaintiffs could possibly succeed is to attempt to assert that
real estate had remained high until after the 1984 forfeiture, and
that then the prices went down.

It seems unbelievably convenient

for the plaintiffs that prices remained high until just after
they decided to forfeit, and then immediately plunged.

This is

contrary to the weight of the evidence, not to mention logic as
well.

We respectfully submit that the clear weight of the

evidence showed prices had already plunged, and that that was
the basis for plaintiffs decision to abandon the property, subject
to holding oritur awhile to see what the economy would bring.

CONCLUSION
One rarely encounters a greater miscarriage of justice
than that presented by this case.

Defendant sold plaintiffs1

predecessors 76 acres for $152,000, six acres have been deeded
off (or hopelessly encumbered) so the defendant has only received
back 70 acres out of the original 76.

(An additional 5,21 acres

has been taken by the eminent domain proceedings, and a high
tension power line crosses the property with resulting severance
damage to the rest of the tract.
Plaintiffs' predecessors paid $76,190.36 on the
contract for principal and interest.

Notwithstanding those facts,

the defendant is being required to pay back to the plaintiffs
$71,183.14, which is a sum virtually equal to the total of
principal and interest paid on the contract, has been deprived of
six acres of land worth $30,000, and has been deprived of the land
for at least three years.

(The 70 acres which were returned to

the defendant had a Notice of Interest recorded against it at the
time of the trial, which the trial Court elected to ignore.)

Thus

the buyers in effect are able to walk off with six acres of land,
get virtually all the money back that they paid on the contract,
and were able to hold the land for at least three years and leave
defendant a sorry remnant of the original parcel, and that with a
recorded cloud on the title, with a high tension power line
encumbering the tract and in need of $30,000 in restoration work.
Plaintiffs' predecessors were not unfortunate buyers who

had an unfortunate economic reversal, resulting in an honest
inability to complete the contract.

Plaintiffs' predecessors

decided that in view of the damage to the proposed subdivision by
having high tension power lines placed across it and the economic
decline in Duchesne County, that they would wilfully, as a matter
of business "judgment," abandon the project as being not
economically feasible, and thereafter assigned their "claim"
to plaintiffs, who were total strangers to the transaction.
Defendant respectfully requests this court to rectify
this miscarriage of justice and to reverse the decision of the
trial Court, and direct the entry of judgment in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action, and
therewith award the six acres to defendant, with her costs.
Respectfully submitted,

GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for Defendant
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ROBERT F. ORTON - #A2483
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3800
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY

5

STATE OF UTAH

6
7
8

ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G,
BELLON, B. CURTIS DASTRUP,
LANIS B. DASTRUP, and
A. LABRUM & SONS, INC.,

9

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,

10
vs.
11
MARVEL L. MALNAR,

Civil No. 85-CV-187D

12
Defendant.
13
This matter

14

came on regularly

for trial before the

15

Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Seventh Judicial District Judge, sitting

16

without

a jury, on February

17

present

in court and represented by their attorney, Robert F.

18

Orton of the firm of Marsden, Orton & Cahoon, and Defendant being

19

present

20

Madsen

21

testimony and received

22

under advisement pending the filing by the parties of post-trial

23

memoranda; and the Court having received Plaintiffs' Post Trial

24

Statement of Points and Authorities, the Post Trial Memorandum of

in court and
and

Robert

7 and

8, 1988, Plaintiffs being

represented by her attorneys, Gordon A.

C. Cummings; and

the Court

having

heard

exhibits and having taken this matter

Defendant, and Plaintiffs 1
Defendant, and

having

Reply

reviewed

to Post Trial Memorandum of

and

studied

said

memoranda,

together with the pleadings, exhibits and papers on file herein;
and the Court having read and considered

the original proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the original proposed
Judgment and Decree submitted by Plaintiffs1 counsel on or about
April 28, 1988, and the Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment submitted by Defendant's counsel
on

or

about

May

4,

1988, and

having

signed

its Ruling

On

Objections To Proposed Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And
Judgment

on the 5th day of May, 1988;

considered
having

and the Court having

the evidence, the Rules of Court and

been

fully

advised

in

the premises

the law, and

and

good

cause

appearing, now makes and enters the following Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs, Arvin L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B.

Curtis Dastrup and Lanis B. Dastrup, are residents of Duchesne
County, State of Utah, and Plaintiff, A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., is
a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State
of Utah, with

its principal

office and place of business in

Duchesne County, Utah.
2.

Defendant,

Marvel

L.

Malnar,

(hereinafter

"Malnar") is a resident of Duchesne County, State of Utah.

3.
Ferron Elder
earnest

On December
(hereinafter

money

agreement

18, 1980, Malnar, as seller, and
"Elder"), as buyer, entered

into an

for

of

the sale and

purchase

the

following described real property situated in Duchesne County,
State of Utah, consisting of seventy-six (76) acres, to wit:
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M.
Section 34: West half of Northwest quarter
LESS:
4 acres more or less, beginning 630
feet from the Northwest corner of said
section, and running East 690 feet; thence
South 330 feet; thence West 140 feet; thence
North 100 feet; thence West 550 feet; thence
North 230 feet to the point of beginning.
TOGETHER with 12 shares of Class D Dry Gulch
Irrigation Water.
T O G E T H E R w i t h a l l i m p r o v e m e n t s and
appurtenances thereunto belonging.
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all oil, gas and
mineral rights.
SUBJECT to all existing rights-of-way and
easements of record.
The earnest money agreement provided for the release of six (6)
acres of said seventy-six (76) acre tract to Elder at the time of
closing.

Said six (6) acre tract is situated in Duchesne County,

State of Utah, and is more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Section
34, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Uintah
Special Meridian and running thence East
630.0 feet; thence South 230.0 feet; thence
EcCs+- 550.0 feet; thence South 100.0 feet more
or less to the South line of the North Half
of the North Half of the Northwest quarter of
3

tne JNomnwest guamer or saia section; rnence
West 1180.0 feet more or less to the West
line of said Section; thence North 330.0 feet
more or less to the point of beginning. 6.04
acres more or less.
4.

On December

19, 1980, Malnar and Elder entered

into a real estate contract for the sale and purchase of said
seventy-six (76) acres based upon the December 18, 1980, earnest
money

agreement; however,

the real estate

mention of the release to Elder of the six

contract

made

no

(6) acre parcel at

closing.
5.

On the same date, to wit:

December

19, 1980,

Malnar and Elder executed an escrow agreement with First Security
Bank of Utah, Roosevelt office, as escrow agent, and deposited
with the agent said real estate contract, a copy of a warranty
deed dated December 19, 1980, from Malnar to Elder conveying said
six (6) acre tract, a copy of a notice of Elder f s interest in the
seventy-six (76) acres dated December 19, 1980, and a quit-claim
deed from Elder to Malnar dated December 19, 1980, and covering
the entire seventy-six (76) acre tract.
6.

The original warranty deed covering the six (6)

acre tract was immediately delivered to Elder and Elder recorded
said warranty

deed

on December

29, 1980, thereby placing the

legal title to said six (6) acres in his name.

4

7.

The purchase price for the seventy-six (76) acres

was ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS

($152,000.00).

The

real estate contract called for a down payment of TWENTY-THREE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($23,500.00) at closing, interest
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum on the unpaid balance,
and subsequent annual payments.
8.

On December 31, 1980, Elder assigned his interest

in the real estate contract with Malnar to Clark Jenkins, Richard
McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey, and J. McRae Johnson

(hereinafter

"Jenkins, et al. ") by means of a contract of sale covering the
same seventy-six (76) acre tract as was sold by Malnar to Elder,
as aforesaid.
9.

On January 30, 1987, Elder and Clark Jenkins, et

al. , assigned all of their right, title and interest in and to
the real estate contract with Malnar and the seventy-six
acres described

(76)

therein to the Plaintiffs above named for good

and valuable consideration.
10.

Elder defaulted on the December 19, 1980, real

estate contract with Malnar by failing to make the annual payment
due on December 19, 1983, or within thirty (30) days thereafter.
On January

19, 1984, Malnar gave Elder notice of default and

Elder failed to cure the default within the time and as provided
by said real estate contract.
5

11.
of

On February 3, 1984, in accordance with the terms

the December

19, 1980, real estate contract and the said

escrow agreement, Malnar requested that the escrow agent, First
Security Bank of Utah, release to her the escrow documents and,
on the same date, Malnar recorded the quit-claim deed from Elder
conveying back to her the entire seventy-six (76) acres.
12.
Malnar

on

The

the

following

December

19,

payments

were

1980, real

made

estate

by

Elder

to

contract, on

or

about the following dates, to wit:

Date

Principal

In t e rest

Total

12/19/80
01/21/82
02/01/83

$23,500.00
12,403.81
14,226.65

-0$13,941 .37
12,118.53

$23,500.00
26,345. 18
_26,345. 18

$50,130.46

$26,059.90

$76,190.36

Total
13.
after

The principal balance owing to Malnar by Elder

the February

payment

1, 1983, payment was $101,919.54, after

of escrow fees and expenses and with interest paid to

said date.
14.
Transmission
eminent

On

September

Cooperative

domain

proceedings

19, 1982, Deseret

(hereinafter

Generation

"Deseret")

for the purpose

&

commenced

of acquiring

an

easement across 5.22 acres of the seventy-six (76) acres covered
by the December

19, 1980, contract and on October 18, 1982, an

6

order of

immediate occupancy was entered and a required cash

deposit paid into court by Deseret for the landowner.
15.

On

March

assignors, to wit:

7,

1985,

Malnar

and

Plaintiffs'

Elder and Jenkins, et al. , entered into a

written stipulation

in the eminent domain proceeding, by the

terms of which they agreed that Malnar was to receive all damages
awarded in said eminent domain action and that Plaintiffs1 said
assignors 1

interest

in the seventy-six

(76) acres would

be

limited to a claim against Malnar for equitable restitution of
monies

forfeited

under

the December

19, 1980, real

estate

contract.
16.
received

the

On or about the 30th day of March, 1985, Malnar
sum

of

NINE

THOUSAND

SEVENTY-FIVE

DOLLARS

($9,075.00) and on or about the 30th day of December, 1986, she
received the sum of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($32,000.00), for
a total of FORTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE DOLLARS
from said eminent domain proceedings.

($41,075.00)

She expended, by way of

costs and attorney's fees in said action, the sum of SIX THOUSAND
DOLLARS

($6,000.00), giving her net receipts from the eminent

domain proceedings of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS
($35,075.00).
17.
acres,

as

of

The

fair market value of the SEVENTY-SIX

February

3,

1984, the date
7

that Malnar

(76)
took

j || possession of said
2

real property

and recorded her quit-claim

II deed, was ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($180,000.00), and

«

the fair market value of the six (6) acres previously deeded from

4

the seventy-six

c

DOLLARS

g I

remaining seventy (70) acres as of that date of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY

7

THOUSAND DOLLARS ($150,000.00).

g

18.

leaving

a fair market

Malnar received, on the December

value

of

the

19, 1980, real

estate contract with Elder, which called for a purchase price of
ONE

10

U
12

($30,000.00),

I

9

(76) acres to Elder in 1980 was THIRTY THOUSAND

HUNDRED

following
I DOLLARS

!3

AND

FIFTY-TWO

sums:

THOUSAND

DOLLARS

($152,000.00),

the

FIFTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY AND 46/100

($50,130.46) principal; TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIFTY -NINE

90/100

DOLLARS

($26,059.90)

14 J THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE DOLLARS
15 J eminent

interest; and

THIRTY-FIVE

(35,075.00) net receipts from the

domain proceedings; and, upon exercising her right of

II

16 I forfeiture under said real estate contract on February 3, 1984,
17 I1 she received

seventy

(70) acres of land having a fair market

18 l! value of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($150,000.00).
19
20

19.
I HUNDRED

Malnar paid the total sum of ONE THOUSAND SEVEN

SEVENTY-FOUR

AND

52/100 DOLLARS

($1,774.52) in real

21 I

property taxes and water assessments which should have been paid

22 I

by Elder,

23
24

20.
receive

title

December

to the said six

(6) acre parcel at closing on

19, 1980 f as is more particularly

following:
warranty

It was the intent of Elder and Malnar that Malnar

evidenced by the

the delivery to Elder on December 19, 1980, of the
deed covering the six (6) acres and the recording by

Elder of said deed; the earnest money agreement dated December
18,

1980, which provided that the said six

conveyed

(6) acre tract be

to Elder; and the treatment by Elder after closing on

December 19, 1980, of the said six (6) acres as his sole property
by making conveyances and assignments with respect thereto.
21.

The inclusion of said six (6) acre tract in the

legal description of real property covered by the real estate
contract dated December 19, 1980, and the quit-claim deed which
was placed

in escrow on that date and which was recorded by

Malnar on February 3, 1984, was the result of a mutual mistake of
fact on the part of Malnar and Elder and the drafter of said
instruments who carried

forward

the legal description of the

seventy-six (76) acres and neglected to exclude the six (6) acres
covered in the warranty deed from Malnar to Elder.
22.

At the time of default by Elder, as aforesaid,

Malnar did not receive good marketable title to said six (6) acre
parcel even though it was included in the legal description of
the quit-claim deed recorded by Malnar on February 3, 1984.
9

23.

The only way

that

the Court can calculate the

damage to Defendant, by reason of the breach of the real estate
contract by Elder, in an equitable manner is to use the loss of
interest approach.

Rental value of the real property in question

is hard to assess because of the problems relative to the legal
title

to the six

(6) acres and

the existence of the eminent

domain suit which was initiated during the time that the real
estate contract was in force.

In calculating said damages the

Court finds that Malnar is entitled to retain the interest paid
on the real estate contract on January 21, 1982 and February 1,
1983.

In addition thereto, she is entitled to interest on the

unpaid

balance of said

February

contract,

3, 1984, in the amount

from February

1, 1983, to

of TEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED

FORTY-SEVEN AND 80/100 DOLLARS ($10,247.80).
24.

The

Court,

after

making

an analysis

of

foregoing facts, finds:
(a) The following amount was
paid by Elder on the December 19,
1980, real estate contract
($50,130.46 principal plus
$26,059.90 interest plus $35,075.00
net eminent domain proceeds):
(b) Malnar sustained the
following damages ($26,059.90
interest on unpaid contract
balance from December 19, 1980,
to February 1, 1983, and
$10,247.80 from February 1,
1983, to February 3, 1984;
10

$111,265.36

the

$1,774.52 in taxes and water
assessments paid by Malnar
for Elder; and $2,000.00
difference between contract
price of $152,000.00 and fair
market value of property
returned on February 3, 1984):

$ 40,082.22

(c) The difference between
the amounts calculated in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this
paragraph numbered 24 should be
returned by Malnar to Plaintiffs,
to wit:

$ 71,183.14

25.

The

Court,

after

making

an analysis

of

the

foregoing facts, finds that the finding made in sub-paragraph (c)
of paragraph

numbered

24 hereof

is further

supported by the

following:
(a) The principal balance
owing on the December 19, 1980,
contract, after the February 1,
1983, payment ($101,919.54), plus
interest on said principal
balance from February 1, 1983,
to February 3, 1984 ($10,247.80),
plus taxes and assessments paid
by Malnar for Elder ($1,774.52)
amounts to the following sum
which Malnar might reasonably
have expected to recover had
there been no breach, to wit:
(b) The net amount received
by Malnar from the eminent domain
proceedings ($35,075.00) plus the
fair market value of the real
property returned to Malnar on
February 3, 1984, ($150,000.00) is:
(c) The difference between
the amounts calculated in sub11

$113,941.86

$185,075.00

paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
paragraph numbered 25 is the
following sum which fairly and
reasonably approximates the
amount calculated in paragraph
numbered 24(c) hereof, to wit:
26.
1980,

real

amount

of

assignors,

The amounts received by Malnar on the December 19,
estate

proceedings

$ 71,133.14

contract

and

from

the

eminent

are grossly excessive and disproportionate
actual
to wit:

damage

suffered

by her, and

domain
to the

Plaintiffs 1

Elder and Jenkins, et al . , suffered an

unconscionable forfeiture.
27.

To the extent that the foregoing Findings of Fact

are more appropriately Conclusions of Law, they shall be deemed
to be such.
On the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendant,
Marvel J. Malnar, as follows:
1.

Adjudging

and decreeing

that Defendant has no

right, title or interest in and to the six (6) acre tract of land
described at the end of paragraph numbered

3 of the Foregoing

Findings of Fact.
2.
clause of

Adjudging and decreeing that the liquidated damage

the December

19, 1980, real estate contract not be

enforced.
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ROBERT F. ORTON - #A2483
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3800

"in DISTRICT COURT DUCHE

MAY 1

V7 i^

-\^
J

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G.
BELLON, B. CURTIS DASTRUP,
LANIS B. DASTRUP, and
A. LABRUM & SONS, INC.,

)
]
j

Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

vs.
MARVEL L. MALNAR,

i

Civil No. 85-CV-187D

Defendant.
This matter

came on regularly

for

trial before the

Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Seventh Judicial District Judge, sitting
without

a jury, on February

7 and

8,

1988, Plaintiffs being

present

in court and represented by their attorney, Robert F.

Orton of the firm of Marsden, Orton & Cahoon, and Defendant being
present
Madsen

in court and
and

testimony

Robert

and

represented by her attorneys, Gordon A.

C. Cummings; and

received

the Court

having

heard

exhibits and having taken this matter

under advisement pending the filing by the parties of post-trial
memoranda; and the Court having received Plaintiffs1 Post Trial
Statement of Points and Authorities, the Post Trial Memorandum of

Defendant, and Plaintiffs' Reply to Post Trial Memorandum of
Defendant, and

having

reviewed

and

studied

said

memoranda,

together with the pleadings, exhibits and papers on file herein;
and the Court having read and considered the proposed original
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the original proposed
Judgment and Decree submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel on or about
April 28, 1988, and the Objections to Proposed Findings Of Fact,
Conclusions Of Law, And Judgment submitted by Defendant's counsel
on

or

about

May

4,

1988, and

having

signed

its Ruling

On

Objections To Proposed Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And
Judgment

on the 5th day of May,

considered

1988; and

the Court having

the evidence, the Rules of Court and the law, and

having been fully advised in the premises, and having entered its
Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law; and

good

cause

appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED:
1.

That the liquidated damage clause of the December

19, 1980, real estate contract entered into by and between Ferron
Elder and Defendant, Marvel L. Malnar, is unenforceable.
2.

That Plaintiffs be and they are hereby awarded

judgment against Defendant, Marvel L. Malnar, in the amount of

2

SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE AND 14/100 DOLLARS
($71,183.14), together with their taxable costs.
3.

That Defendant, Marvel L. Malnar, has no right,

title or interest in and to the following described real property
situated in Duchesne County, State of Utah, to wit:
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Section
34, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Uintah
Special Meridian and running thence East
630.0 feet; thence South 230.0 feet; thence
East 550.0 feet; thence South 100.0 feet more
or less to the South line of the North Half
of the North Half of the Northwest quarter of
the Northwest Quarter of said section; thence
West 1180.0 feet more or less to the West
line of said Section; thence North 330.0 feet
more or less to the point of beginning. 6.04
acres more or less.
4.

That Plaintiffs be and they are hereby awarded

interest on all amounts set forth in paragraph numbered 2 hereof
at the rate of TWELVE PERCENT

(12%) per annum from the date of

entry of this Judgment and Decree until paid.
DATED this

/ /

day of

3

/^^A?*/

_._., 1988.

EXHIBIT
"T?

I
* I R E A L

THIS

CONTRACT

December,

1980,

E S T A T E
made

by

and

and

C O N T R A C T

entered

between

into

MARVEL

j<fP

this
MALNARf

day

who

of

shall

hereinafter be singularly or collectively referred to as Seller;
and

FERRON

ELDER,

who

shall

hereinafter

be

singularly

or

collectively referred to as Buyer:
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Seller is the owner and is in possession of certain
property

which property

desirous of

selling

is hereinafter described and Seller is

said property to Buyer upon the terms and

conditions as set forth herein; and
WHEREAS,

Buyer

is

desirous

of

purchasing

said

property

according to the covenants and agreements herein contained.
NOW,
covenants

THEREFORE,
and

in consideration

agreements between

of

the mutual promises,

the Buyer

and Seller and the

sums herein agreed to be paid, the parties hereto mutually agree
as follows:
1.

PROPERTY:
Pursuant to the terms hereinafter set forth, the Seller does

hereby sell and the Buyer does hereby buy the following described
property being situated

in Duchesne County, State of Utah, to-

wit:
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M.
Section 34: West half of Northwest quarter
LESS: 4 acres more or less, beginning 630 feet from the
Northwest corner of gaid section, and running East 690 feet;
thence South 330 feet ; thence West 140 feet; the nee North
100 feet; thence West 550 feet; thence North 230 feet to the
point of beginning.

TOGETHER with 12 shares of Class D Dry Gulch Irrigation
Water.
TOGETHER
with
all
improvements
and
appurtenances
thereunto belonging.
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all oil, gas and mineral
rights.
SUBJECT to all existing rights-of-way and easements of
record.
2.

PURCHASE PRICE AND METHOD OF PAYMENT:
Buyer

agrees

and

does

now

purchase

the

above

described

property and agrees to pay to the Seller therefor the sum of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($152,000.00) in lawful money

jipaid balances as set forth below until paicj in £ull( to-wit:
a.

A down payment in the sum of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED

DOLLARS ($23,500.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the
Seller from the Buyer.
b.

The remaining balance of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE

HUNDRED DOLLARS ($128,500.00) be.paid as follows:

Two equal yearly in-

stallments of $26,395.18 each which includes principal and interest to
due date.

Three equal yearly installments of $40,234.16, each which

includes principal and interest to due date, such payments of larger
amount being first due in 1983.

Buyer also agrees that in the event of

a late payment to pay any additional earned interest from the date said
payment was due to date of payment.

The first payment shall be due one

year from closing and all subsequent payments shall be due on the same
date each year thereafter until interest and principal are paid in full.
All payments shall first be applied to earned interest.
3.

EARLY PAYMENTS:
It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the Buyer may make

early payments of amounts not

yet due under the terms and conditions of

this agreement, provided, however, that such early payments shall not
release Buyer of the responsibility of making the regular installments
required in provision 2. above.
be first applied

Said early payments, if any there be, shalJ

to interest due and owing, and then shall be deducted

from the total principal due and owing.
4.

ESCROW AGENT:
The parties do hereby mutually agree and by these presents conct i l »-.-o

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., Roosevelt Office as their escrow acji; L
to hold the papers and documents in connection herewith and to receive
payment thereon and to perform such other acts as shall be required u^lor
the terms of this agreement by the escrow agent.
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that the only obligation imposed upon the escrow agent is to hold the papers in connccLion
herewith and to receive
agreement.

the payments as made/under the terms of this

The said escrow agent shall not be liable or obligated to

send any notices of non-payment
this contract.

The parties

of

non-compliance with the terms of

of the United States, with interest at the rate of 10% per annum,
on all unpaid balances as set forth below until paid in full, towit:
a.
HUNDRED

A down payment in the sum of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE
DOLLARS

($23,500.00)

the

receipt

of

which

is hereby

acknowledged by the Seller from the Buyer.
b.

The

remaining

balance

of

ONE

HUNDRED

TWENTY-EIGHT

THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($128,500.00) be paid as follows:
Seven equal yearly installments of $26,395.18 each which includes
principal and interest to due date.

Buyer also agrees that in

the event of a late payment to pay any additional earned'interest
from the date said payment was due to date of paynvent.
payment

The first

shall be due one year from closing and all subsequent

payments shall be due on the same date each year thereafter until
interest and principal

are paid

in full.

All payments

shall

first be applied to earned interest.
3.

EARLY PAYMENTS:
It

is agreed

by and between

the parties

hereto

that the

Buyer may make early payments of amounts not yet due under the
terms and conditions of this agreement, provided, however, that
such early payments shall not release Buyer of the responsibility
of

making

the

regular

installments

required

early payments, if any

in provision 2.

above.

Said

there be, shall be first

applied

to interest due and owing, and then shall be deducted

from the total principal due and o-zing.
4.

ESCROW AGENT:
The parties do hereby mutually agree and by these presents

constitute First Security Bank of Utch, N.A., !?5osevelt Office an
their escrow agent to hold the papers and documents in connection
herewith and to receive payment thereon and to perform such other
acts as shall be required under the terms of this agree p-?.nt \>r
the escrow agent.
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that the
only obligation

imposed

upon the escrow agent

is to hold the

papers in connection herewith and to receive the payments as made
under the terms of this agreement.

The said escrow agent snail

not be liable or obligated to send anv n^n~-- ~ r

hereby agree that they will simultaneously with the execution of
this

contract,

execute

an

their affairs concerning

escrow

agreement

which will

govern

this escrow, and the said escrow agent

shall be bound by said escrow agreement only.

The failure of the

parties hereto to deposit the proper papers as herein provided
shall not render the escrow Hgent
escrow agent
marketability

liable for the same, and the

is under no obligation to examine or determine the
of

title, genuineness

or

value

of

any document

herein placed with the escrow agent to be held by it.
It is mutually agreed between the Seller and Buyer that all
contract and escrow costs shall be divided equally.
5.

PLACE OF PAYMENTS:
It

hereto

is mutually
that

after

understood
the

and

execution

agreed

of

this

between

the parties

agreement,

that

all

payments of either principal and/or interest shall be made at the
office of the escrow agent named abo>;e.
6.

TAXES AND POSSESSION:
The parties further mutually agree that the Seller shall pay

all

taxes

and

assessments

of

any

kind

and

nature

that

have

accrued prior to the execution of this contract, and the Buyer
shall pay all taxes and assessments after said date and for so
long as this contract shall remain in force.

The parties agree

that possession of the said premises shall be as of the date of
this agreement.
7.

ABSTRACT OF TITLE, WARRANTY DEED, ETC.:
The parties hereto agree to deposit with ths escrow agent

the following instruments:
Warranty Deed
Quit Claim Deed
The original of this Contract
Notice of Interest In Real Estate Contract (copy)
The Buyer

acknowledges

that

the Seller has

the option

dt t!-j

conclusion of this contract to either furnish the Buyer with an
abstract of title extended to date, or to furnish the Buyer with
a policy of title

insurance

price of said property.

in an amount equal to the purchase

The Seller further agrees and covenants

with the Buyer that the property shall be free and clear of all
. . _*„„•. ,*^nc nf

t-itle nt

the

tim» of

f i n a l payment.
8.

INSURANCE:
Since

no

buildings

personal

are

on

property

the subject

is being

sold,

and

property, no insurance

since

no

shall be

required,
9.

FINAL PAYMENT:
Upon

final

payment

heretofore described
the escrow
fully

full

of

the

purchase

price,

the

instruments shall be delivered to Buyer by

agent, with

paid

in

a receipt showing this agreement to be

and 'discharged;

and

at

that

time

tnere

shall

be

inscribed across the face of this instrument the words, "PAID IN
FULL",

with

the

date

thereof

and

have the same

initialed or

signed by the proper authority of the escrow agent.
10.

COVENANTS:
The Buyer agrees and covenants with the Seller to perform

each

and

every

duty

imposed

contract; to not commit
any

waste

remaining

to

be

equity

upon Buyer by

terms of

this

any waste on said premises, nor permit

committed,
of

the

the

as

to

Seller.

injure

the

reversion

Buyer has present

or

right to

continue to survey, subdivide and to obtain final approval for
Diamond Acres Subdivision, during the pendency of this contract,
11.

REPRESENTATIONS:
The parties hereto represent that they are familiar with the

premises

herein

described

and

to be conveyed;

that

they have

examined the same and Buyer accepts said property in its present
condition.
items

of

The parties
personalty

further agree that if there are other

thereon

agreement,

the exclusion

or

same

not

the

does

indicate

which
failure

are

not

included

in

this

to list and designate the

retention

by

the

teller

or

the

transfer of the same to the Buyer.
12.

TI'lE OF B6SJSHG&.

£RACE--*ND...DEFAULT.

It is further agreed that time shall be the essence of this
agreement

and

if

the

said

Buyer

shall

fail

to

pay

the

installments due hereunder at the time herein specified or fail
to

keep

any

imposed, or

other
fail

covenant

to pay

of

said

Buyer

by

this

contract

the taxes or assessments on the said

property when the same shall become due, then and in that event,
the Seller, after thirty (30) days after such default, shall have
the following alternative remedies:
A.

Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer

to remedy the default within five days after written notice, to
be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey
said property, and all payments which have been made theretofore
on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller
as liquidated

damages for the non-performance of the contract,

and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter
and take possession of said premises without legal processes as
in its first and former estate, together with all

improvements

and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions
and

improvements

shall

remain

with

the

land

and

become

the

property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at
will of the Seller; or
B.

The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all

delinquent
(The

use

installments,
of

this

remedy

including
on

one

costs
or

more

and

attorneys

occasions

fees.

shall not

prevent the Seller, at his option, f 1:0m-resorting to cne of the
other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default);
or
C.

The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon

written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid balance
hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this
contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to the Buyer
subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in
accoLdance

with

property

sold

balance

owing,

the

and

laws of

the State of Utah, and have

the proceeds applied

including

costs

and

the

to the paynent of the

attorney's

f^es;

ml

the

Seller may hrye-*r fud-gmsnE lfor*-&ny deficiency-which may remain.
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon thr* filing
of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to the appointment
of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and
collect the rents, issues and

profits

therefrom an3

a: •?! / the

camp to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the r ame

pursuant

to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of

judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession of
the said premises during the period of redemption.
13.

IN RE DEFAULT:
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that in the

event of default or failure of either of the parties hereto in
the performance of the covenants imposed upon either of them by
this contract, or in the payment of the installments or any other
obligation herein provided, then such defaulting party agrees to
pay

all

costs

imposed,

including

a

reasonable

attorney's

fee

incurred in connection with the enforcement of the terms of this
contract or the correction of any condition caused by the breach
of any covenant or obligation herein contained and set forth.
14.

HEIRS, ASSIGNS AND TRANSFERABILITY:
It is mutually agreed and covenanted that the provisions of

this

agreement

shall

apply

to and bind

the heirs, executors,

administrators and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
Buyer hereby

acknowledged

The

that this agreement and any property

herein sold cannot be bargained, sold or assigned to any other
person or party without the written consent of the Seller first
had and obtained.
unreasonably
will

agree

and/or

the

The Seller hereby covenants and agrees not to

withhold
to

Buyer

property

consent

from the Buyer, and

assigning
herein

or

sold,

transfering
to

a

third

that Seller

this

agreement

party

without

requiring additional consideration or early payments, so long as
the proposed third party shall establish evidence satisfactory to
the Seller that the third party is both financially and otherwise
a responsible person or party, and that said third party will
agree in writing to abide by all of the terms and conditions of
this agreement.
allow the Buyer

The acceptance or agreement by the Seller to
to assign Buyer's

interest herein

to a third

party, shall not release the Buyer from any obligation or duty
herein

imposed,

unless otherwise agreed

to

in writing

by the

Seller,
15.

NOTICE OF INTEREST, QUIT-CLAIM, ETC.:
Simultaneous

with

the

execution

of

this

contract,

th*

parties shall jointly execute a Notice of Interest in Real Estate
Contract,

which

addition,

the Buyer

with

affidavit

may

be

shall execute

this contract, quit-claiming

recorded

by

the Buyer.

In

a Quit-Claim Deed to escrow
any interest

in the contract

and property, to be released by the escrow agent ONLY upon Seller
demonstrating
by

to the escrow agent that proper notices were sent

the Seller

to the Buyer, at the last known address of the

Buyer, and that more than ten (10) days have elapsed since the
last notice was received, and that the Buyer has not remedied his
default.
16.

ADDRESSES:
The current mailing addresses of each of .the parties is as

follows:
SELLER

BUYER

Marvel Malnar
Box 6
Neola, Utah
Until

Ferron Elder
960 East 1050 North
84053

either

Bountiful, Utah

party

shall

notify

the

84010

escrow

agent,

in

writing, of a change of address, the above address may be relied
upon by either party

as being

notices to the other party.

the proper

address

Proof of mailing by either party of

any notice, etc., to the other party may be had
customary

procedures

for

for sending

establishing

the

same,

in any of the
and

shall be

conclusively established, if said address is relied upon.
17.

LOT RELEASES:
Upon payment of

the sum ofl C2-j200.00

in addition

to the

annual payments herein required, Se?ller agrees to release 1 acre
lots.

The releases will be upon approval of Bow Valley Resources

of Denver, Colorado.

Buyer shall receive credit for all sums

paid for lot releases on the last payments to become due.
not

intended

that

said -*$2,200,4^* per

acre "should

be

It is
extra

consideration, but merely early payment for early release of the
lot.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF we have hereunto set our hands the day
and year first above written.
SELLER:
;7?<7/L^K^^
MARVEL MALNAR

m

a^yT^L-

BUYER:

RON ELDER
FERRON
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Duchesne

: ss.
)

C

VT

On this IJ
day of December, 1980, personally appeared
before me MARVEL MALNAR as Seller; and FERRON ELDER, as Buyer?
the signers of the foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to
me that they executed the same.

My Commission Expires:

-#%££-

Notary Public
Residing ats

Recorded at Request of—tyn<u**>^.}ftLjU~MsU.
n.AlSPm.

^^^«^Le,....^i^^-^^..j3^^-^T.J!H ^

Fee Paid \_&.?1

b){.}iQcuA^i^u^

VA<U**t(<±fr...3J./.f.fl?

<Ltf„._. Dep. BookJiL//A-

Pagc.3_^3... Rcf.t

Add^»$._J^^_5..^..V^<^^:.f^^^^';,"^^

Mail tax notice to

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
FERRON ELDER
°f R o o s e v e l t
QUIT-CLAIM to

County of

grantor
, State of Utah, hereby

Duchesne

MARVEL MALNAR , a k a MARVEL L . MALNAR,

grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS,

of R o o s e v e l t , County o f D u c h e s n e , S t a t e o f Utah
TEN and NO/100
the following described tract
State of Utah:

of land in Duchesne

County,

TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M.
Section 34: West half of Northwest quarter
LESS:

4 acres m/1 Beginning 630 feet from the Northwest
corner of Section 34, running East 690 feet
South 330 feet West 140 feet North 100 feet West
550 feet North 230 feet to the point of beginning.

TOGETHER with 12 shares of Class D Dry Gulch Irrigation
water•
TOGETHER with all improvements and appurtenances
thereunto belonging.
EXECEPTING AND RESERVING all oil, gas and mineral rights.
SUBJECT to all existing rights-of-way and easements of
record.

the hand of said grantor , this
19 th
December
> A. D. one thousand nine hundred and

day of

WITNESS

Signed in the presence of

STATE OF UTAH,

1

County of Duchesne
On
thousand nine hundred and

i9th
Eighty

r

J rIijX/ZZ^£'^'.

Eighty
k.^.A_£L-£»x^<£—7r3?_.

day of
December
personally appeared before me

FERRON ELDER
the signer of the foregoing instrument, .who duly acknowledge to me that
same*

he

A. D. one

executed the

-Jk*^ *$• (diuUa^JL

State of Utah
( ss.
County of Duchesne (
I,

CAROLYNE..MADSEN

_

f

County Recorder

in and for Duchesne County, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct
copy of the ....JP.5X..NWBER_2^
Book_NumberMA110A_Page_363

and now on file and of record in my office.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the official seal of said office, this
^sh.^
day 0f
February
j_g _ 88 _ #
. . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
County Recorder

.•corded at Request of
nif'ty.M.

2125X4

/J-2?-fd

A^ur^ ^ArJt

,2^.

Fee Paid?,
Dep. Book £1 '7 f Paga

Mail tax notice to

ff/

Ref..

Address

WARRANTY DEED
MARVEL L„ MALNAR, a m a r r i e d woman,
of
Neola
.County of
Duchesne
CONVEY and WARRANT to

grantor
, State of Utah, hereby

FERRON C. ELDER,

of

grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS,

960 E a s t , 1050 N o r t h , B o u n t i f u l , Utah
TEN
a n d o t h e r good a n d v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

the following described tract
State of Utah:

of land in

Duchesne

County,

Beginning a t the Northwest c o r n e r o f S e c t i o n 34,
Township 2 S o u t h , Range 1 West, U i n t a h S p e c i a l M e r i d i a n
and r u n n i n g t h e n c e E a s t 6 3 0 . 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e S o u t h 2 3 0 . 0
f e e t ; thence East 550.0 f e e t ; thence South 100.0 f e e t
more o r l e s s t o t h e S o u t h l i n e o f t h e N o r t h H a l f o f t h e
North Half o f the Northwest q u a r t e r o f t h e Northwest
Q u a r t e r o f s a i d s e c t i o n ; t h e n c e West 1 1 8 0 . 0 f e e t more o r
l e s s t o t h e West l i n e o f s a i d S e c t i o n ; t h e n c e N o r t h 3 3 0 . 0
f e e t more o r less
t o the point o f beginning.
6.04 a c r e s
more o r l e s s .

WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this
December
, A. D. 19

19 t h

day of

80

Signed in the Presence of
Marvel L.

Malnar

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

as.

DUCHESNE

On the
19th
day of
personally appeared before me
the signer
same.

December
MARVEL MALNAR,

9 A. D, 19 80
a k a M a r v e l L. M a l n a r ,

of the within instrument, whoduly acknowledged to me that she
" • \ » <; *''*/'''-

-:.. v 5-^ '*:•?*'•*-"

-1 - ~

executed the

Nonpublic
M o n b . Utah 84053

State of Utah

)
V SS.

County of Duchesne (
I,

CMPLYNE.I^SEN

f

County Recorder

in and for Duchesne County, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct
copy of the
EEL?OJJM?]^
Book..Number _.A79> .Page 41
and now on file and of record in my office.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
*^e ° ^ c ^ s e a ^ °^ sa *d office, this
lebruar^
f 19...88....

"©rAlNTVFPS 1
EXHIBIT
I
, ~ 3 r > " " " " " •** «<•* *-.-

•

M&htfi

.C^t^i^....^^
yfT.rrz...:..zzA/.rs«*<.

day of

-y:-r.hrr*.:..¥\j*&.4^.
County Recorder

The Citizens Bank
1175 Country Hills Drive
Oqden, Utah 84403

#6-4426
#5209

^ Z^GS5 PPCOTKM *t r « q u w ci &S &£&/.,<% < & A A r** K«W - ^ ° < * •
'J2&2L at /AY£M .. S^<fa'c(M*^\«> _Uim«0 Gounty R<j2.<yrf»
'/lftrt/4*i

Odputy Book

*3<P(,

WARRANTY DEED
Perron C. Elder, g r a n t o r r e s i d i n g within the S t a t e of Utah,
hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS t o D a r r e l l D i d e r i c k s a n ,

grantee, of

285 West North Temple, S u i t e 1-D, S a l t Lake City, Utah 84103, for
good and valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,

ti

the f o l l o w i n g described

real

e s t a t e s i t u a t e d in Uintah County, State o f Utah, to w i t :
' B e g i n n i n g a t t h e N o r t h w e s t Corner o f S e c t i o n 3 4 ,
Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Uintah S p e c i a l Base &
M e r i d i a n and running t h e n c e East 6 3 0 . 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e
South 230.0 f e e t ; thence East 5 5 0 . 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e South
1 0 0 . 0 f e e t more or l e s s to the South l i n e o f the North
Half of the North Half o f the Northwest Quarter o f t h e
Northwest Quarter o f s a i d S e c t i o n ; thence West 1180.0
f e e t more or l e s s t o t h e West l i n e o f s a i d S e c t i o n ;
thence North 3 3 0 . 0 f e e t more or l e s s to t h e p o i n t o f
beginning.

f\c

Witness the hands o f the Grantor,

this

5""1

day o f

February, 1985.

Ferron Elder^
STATE OP UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

Kl

iLk •s-<

)
) ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this Z__~ day of February,

1985.
V I.
rt^Commtssion; ; Expires:
&;

i*»\*^ftrQl
r

OF

•*%\%

Gfc' y

m

ou>Notary Public
Residing a t : (S" x U k , O q j c ^ -

d

DEFENDANT'S

!

EXHIBIT

Vi

^'X^A

NOTICE OF INTEREST

&n«r*

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
You will please take notice that the undersigned, EASTERN
UTAH RESOURCES, a Utah General Partnership, claims an interest in
that certain real property located in Duchsene County, State of
Utah and more particularly described as follows:
All of the West half of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 34, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, U. S. M.
Less: 4 acres more or less, beginning 630 feet from
the Northwest corner of said section, and running
East 690 feet; thence South 330 feet; thence West
140 feet; thence North 100 feet; thence West 550
feet; thence North 230 feet to the point of
beginning.
Together
Irrigation with
Water. 12 share of class D Dry Gulch
Together with all improvements and appurtenances
thereunto belonging except and reserving all oil,
gas and mineral rights. Subject to all existing
rights-of-way and easements of record.
under that assignment of contract dated the 25th day of February,
1983, wherein Ferron Elder assigned all of his right title and
interest in that certain Real Estate Contract made and entered
Into on the 14th day of December, 1980, by and between Marvel
Malnar as seller and Ferron Elder as buyer.
EASTERN UTAH RESOURCES,

byj2^

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)

GenerapTa^

)S8

)

_
w5vi.iig wocice
of I n t e r e s t
Utah
authorit-v^^^.cu^eu
„ F fifj *cnat
a r t nsame
p r c K ion
" b!e.hn aa ll ff ooff EEaasstteerrnn
he General
e x e c u t e d P the
Utah R e s o u r c e s , a Utah General P a r t n e r s h i p , pursuant to the
a u t h o r i t y o f the partnership a g r e e m e n t

My a m i s s i o n -expires:
%

t> /^/>

<y<i+/

UfcfENUANT#<
* S , EXHIBIT *£

GORDON A. MADSEN, 12048
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777
Attorneys for Defendant Malnar
320 South Third East
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111
Telephone
322-1141
4G
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DESERET GENERATION &
TRANSMISSION COOPERATIVE,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
STIPULATION
vs.
FERRON ELDER, aka FERRON C,
ELDER, MARVEL MALNAR, aka
MARVEL L.MALNER, et al.,

Civil No. 7732

Defendants.
Come now the defendants, Ferron Elder, Clark Jenkins,
Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey, and J. McRay Johnson, by and
through their counsel of record, John P. Ashton and David K.
Broadbent, and defendant, Marvel Malner, by and through her
counsel of record, Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, and
stipulate as follows:
1.

That Marvel Malner is the record owner of that

certain real property involved in the above-entitled action to
which the aforenamed defendants are parties, the real property
being more particularly described as:
The West half of the Northwest quarter of Section 34,
Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Uintah S^ecial-^Meiridian,
less 4 acres, more or less, beqinninq 630 feet-from the

Northwest corner of Section 34, running East 690 feet,
South 330 feetr West 140 feetf North 100 feet, West 550
feet, North 230 feet to the point of beginning.
2.

The parties agree that the defendant, Marvel

Malner, is exclusively entitled to any damages awarded in
connection with the above-entitled action for the taking,
severance and other consequential damages as they relate to the
portion of the above-described property that the plaintiff has
taken and now occupies, which portion is a smaller part of the
larger parcel described above,
3.

Defendants Elder, Jenkins, McCarver, Habey and

Johnson agree their interest in the above-described property is
limited to that of a claim against Marvel Malner for equitable
restitution of monies- forfeited under the r£al_ estate contractbetwe
en themselves and defendant Malner dated December 19, 1980, for
the sale of the above-described property.
DATED this

T7^

day of March, 1985.
JOHN P. ASHTON
DAVID K. BROADBENT

Attorneys for Defendant,
Marvel Malner

465
-2-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Stipulation was
mailed to each of the following at the address shown, postage
prepaid, the

/? * day of March, 1985:
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Lynn W. Mitton, Esq.
F# Elgin Ward, Esq.
8722 South 300 West
Sandy, Utah 84070
Attorneys for Defendants,
A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., Dastrup,
Dastrup, Bellon and Bellon:
Michael R.Labrum, Esq.
108 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Robert F. Orton, Esq.
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants Elder, Jenkins,
McCarver, Mabey and Johnson:
John P. Ashton, Esq.
David K. Broadbent, Esq.
424East Fifth South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorney for Defendant Malnar

